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Summary
The increased need for government-driven coastal
resilience projects will lead to a growing number of
claims for "partial takings" of coastal property. Much
attention has been paid to what actions constitute a
partial taking, but there is less clarity about how to
calculate just compensation for such takings, and
when compensation should be offset by the value of
benefits conferred to the property owner. While the
U.S. Supreme Court has an analytically consistent
line of cases on compensation for partial takings, it
has repeatedly failed (most recently in Home v. U.S.
Department of Agriculture) to articulate a clear rule.
The authors argue the government should compen-
sate property owners based on the free market value
of their remaining property, the calculation of which
should include all nonspeculative, calculable benefits
of the taking.
oastal climate change adaptation strategies are crit-
ical. The U.S. coasts, including the Gulf of Mexico
and the Great Lakes, are home to over 164 m l-
lion people, more than 50% of the U.S. population.1 These
areas support 66 million jobs and $3.4 trillion in wages.2 In
the aggregate, coastal communities "generate 58% of the
national gross domestic product"3 and contribute $6.7 tril-
lion to the U.S. economy.4 Although this concentration of
people, jobs, wealth, and economic energy is threatened by
climate change, there is a feeling among some coastal resi-
dents that it is not climate change but government-driven
coastal resilience projects that truly threaten their property.
Constitutional protection of private property is not abso-
lute. The government may take private property to serve
the public good as long as the government also offers the
property owner "just compensation." While the concept of
public good is capacious, determining just compensation is
often difficult and lacks the guidance of fully articulated
judicial precedent. Courts will need to solve this problem
as governments more frequently acquire private coastal
property, often through eminent domain, to adapt to the
threat of climate change.
This Article considers the issue of just compensation
for partial acquisitions of private property, particularly for
coastal resilience projects. What formula should be used in
determining a property owner's compensation in a partial
taking? What compensation is due the owner of the prop-
erty if, at the time of the taking, the government's pro-
posed use of it is reasonably expected to confer a monetary
benefit on him or her? How should the expectation of a
monetary benefit to the private owner impact the compen-
sation calculation?
This Article argues that, while the U.S. Supreme Court
has an analytically consistent line of cases on compensa-
tion for partial takings, it has failed to articulate a clear
rule and that failure has resulted in significant confusion.
The Court's recent decision in Horne v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture' was a missed opportunity to lay out the simple
rule proposed in this Article: The government should com-
pensate property owners based on the fair market value of
their remaining property, the calculation of which should
Editor's Note: A version of this Article previously appeared in the
Stanford Environmental Law Journal at 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3
(2016).
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include all nonspeculative, calculable benefits of the taking
to the remainder. This Article illustrates its proposed rule
with a recent decision from New Jersey, and concludes that
the Court should follow suit.
1. The Need for Adaptation and the
Option of Eminent Domain
Climate change's effect on coastlines includes accelerated
sea-level rise, increasingly frequent and increasingly severe
coastal storms, erosion, and permanent flooding.6 Sea-level
rise threatens over 5,790 square miles and over $1 trillion
of property and structures.7 In the Mid-Atlantic, for exam-
ple, estimates suggest that 450,000 to 2.3 million people
are at risk from sea-level rise.' Sea-level rise threatens New
Jersey's coastal properties, valued at over $106 billion, and
its tourism revenue, valued in excess of $30 billion.9
The risk is particularly acute given historical develop-
ment patterns. Shoreline developments have "frequently
occurred without adequate regard for coastal hazards,"
as noted in at least one study.10 Sea levels rose at an aver-
age of 1.7 millimeters per year through the 20th century,
and this rate seems to be accelerating.11 Other studies esti-
mate "global sea levels rose approximate eight inches (203
millimeters), despite stable levels over the previous two
millennia."12 Some studies have estimated that global sea
levels could rise by one meter or more over the next 100
years.13 And because sea-level rise has significant inertia, it
will likely continue for many centuries.
14
The threat has not escaped public notice. Sea-level rise
has resulted in a "national conversation about what coastal
developments should be permitted and how they should
be built."1 There have been various attempts to chronicle
local, regional, and national adaptation activities.16 "Hard"
protections, such as sea walls, can exacerbate erosion and
coastal loss, resulting in "negative effects on coastal ecosys-
6. Lara D. Guercio, Climate Change Adaptation and Coastal Property Rights: A
Massachusetts Case Study, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 349, 354 (2013).
7. Moser et al., supra note 1, at 589.
8. Radley Horton et al., Ch.i 6: Northeast, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 378
(U.S. Global Change Research Program ed., May 2014), available athttp://
nca2014.globalchange.gov/system/files-force/downloads/high/NCA3-Cli-
mateChangeImpacts in the United%20StatesHighRes.pdf.
9. CENTER FOR INTEGRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON NEW JERSEY 7 (July 2008), available at http://
www.pinelandsalliance.org/downloads/pinelandsalliance_59.pdf.
10. Moser et al., supra note 1, at 589.
11. Id.
12. Guercio, supra note 6, at 355.
13. Id.
14. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, CH. 6, COASTAL AND Low-LYING AREAS
317 (2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/publications and data /ar4/wg2/en/ch6.
html.
15. Edna Sussman et al., Climate Change Adaptation: Fostering Progress Through
Law and Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 70-71 (2010).
16. See Henry D. Jacoby et al., Ch.27: Mitigation, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 678
(U.S. Global Change Research Program ed., May 2014), available athttp://
nca2014.globalchange.gov/system/files-force/downloads/high/NCA3-Cli-
mateChangeImpacts in the United%20StatesHighRes.pdf.
tems, undermining the attractiveness of beach tourism."17
In contrast, "soft" coastal adaptation strategies, such as
dune renourishment, are inexpensive and effective, which
may explain why they are the most common method of
coastline protection in the United States." "Soft" adapta-
tion "is commonly employed along ocean shores-gener-
ally at public expense."19 In some cases, dunes and other
soft projects might not intrude on private property; in
most cases, however, coastal adaptation projects will
require government possession of strips of private property
on the seaward edge of coastal lots, often achieved through
eminent domain.2"
Naturally, adaptation programs have spawned liti-
gation, from Washington to Texas to Florida to New
Jersey, regarding such issues as coastal sewage systems,
integration of adaptation into utility development
plans, nutrient concerns in changing water conditions,
and insurance considerations, to name a few.21 In Mar-
gate, New Jersey, litigation has already begun over the
Absecon Island Shore Protection Project. The state gov-
ernment has not completed appraisal for all the beach-
front property where it will construct sand dunes for
the project, but because parties cannot agree on a price,
"the state . . . will ask the court to take the easements
by eminent domain," said the city administrator.22 The
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
estimates needing 4,200 easements for public projects
along the coast and, already, 239 owners have indicated
unwillingness to sell their rights.
23
Property acquisition is authorized by the Fifth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, which allows governments
to take private property using eminent domain as long
as the taking meets two criteria.24 First, the government
can only take private property for "public use."25 Gener-
ally speaking, any purpose that promotes the public health,
safety, welfare, or morals is a valid public use.26 Second, the
17. Moser et al., supra note 1, at 589.
18. Thomas J. Campbell & Lindino Benedet, Beach Nourishment Magnitudes
and Trends in the U.S., SI 39 J. COASTAL RES. (Special Issue) 57, 58 (2006),
available at http://www.cerf-jcr.org/images/stories/09-tom.pdf.
19. James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to
Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV.
1279, 1308 (1998).
20. See, eig., Property Owners 7hrow Cold Water on N.J. Shore Protective Dunes
Plan, W VA. PUB. BROAD. (May 26, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://wvpublic.org/
post/property-owners-throw-cold-water-nj-shore-protective-dunes-plan.
21. Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Sue to Adapt?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2177,
2193 (2015).
22. Nanette LoBiondo Galloway, Margate Receives Appraisalfor Dunes Easement;




23. Kevin McArdle, Want Dunes to Protect he Shore? New Jersey Facing Down 239
"Hardcore"Holdouts, NEWJERSEY1015 (Oct. 5,2015), availableathttp://nj 1015.
com/want-dunes-to-protect-the-shore-nj-facing-down-240-hardcore-holdouts.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.").
25. Id. See also, e.g, Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); 26 AM.
JuR 2D Eminent Domain §3 (2015).
26. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 481, 35 ELR 20134 (2005)
("It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-bal-
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government must give the property owner (or prior prop-
erty owner, as the case may be) "just compensation."
27
There are many arguments in favor of eminent domain
in the context of adaptation. It benefits adjacent lands,
28
state procurement makes the public less likely to tolerate
backsliding in mitigation efforts,29 and federal action is
the more rational course because the nation as a whole
contributes to greenhouse warming and therefore the cost
should similarly be borne nationwide.3 1 Whatever justifi-
cations are offered, debates over compensation will flare
and raise questions about the nuances of this constitu-
tional requirement.
In broad terms, the constitutional mandate of just com-
pensation ensures that the government will put the prop-
erty owner "in the same position monetarily as he would
have occupied if his property had not been taken.."31 "To
determine such monetary equivalence, the Court early
established the concept of 'market value"': The owner is
entitled to the fair market value of his property at the time
of the taking.
32
The fair market value rule is easy in principle but more
complicated in practice in the coastal resilience context.
When the government takes a strip of land to build a new
dune system, for example, it might cause a diminishment
in value to the remaining piece of the land, perhaps by
blocking ocean views from the lot. At the same time, how-
ever, the new dunes will protect the property from com-
plete destruction by the next big storm. The questions arise:
What factors should a court consider in calculating com-
pensation? May the court take into account project-related
benefits to the property or only the damages?
II. Judicial Convolution
Courts have long struggled with the "benefit-offset
problem,"' 33 the question of when a court should reduce
compensation because of benefits that the taking con-
fers on the property owner. At the center of the ongoing
struggle is a futile attempt to draw a bright line between
individual and societal benefits. Because the government
can only take property for the purposes of public use, it
is natural that taking will result in some public, and some
private, benefit. It is from this inevitability that a distinc-
tion between "general benefits" and "special benefits" arose
as a nominal tool for determining whether or not to offset
anced as well as carefully patrolled.") (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
33 (1954)).
27. See, e.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 470, 473 (1973); 3-8 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §8.01 (3d ed.
2015).
28. Titus, supra note 19, at 1384.
29. Id. at 1385.
30. Id. at 1385-86.
31. Almota Farmers, 409 U.S. at 474 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 379 U.S.
14, 16 (1970)).
32. Id. (citing New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915)).
33. The phrase "benefit-offset problem" is borrowed from William Fischel.
See WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW, ECONOMICS, POLITICS
(1998).
benefits from a compensation award 4.3 Ultimately, the dis-
tinction, although often referenced, remains nominal and
is rarely applied as an analytical tool.
In short, we argue that courts should dispose of this
muddied general benefit/special benefit dichotomy,3 but it
is nevertheless necessary to have a working explanation of
terms. The "remainder" is the property that stays in private
hands after a partial taking. "General benefits" are benefits
to the remainder that are similar in kind to the benefits
other properties in the area will receive from the govern-
ment project. 6 For example, when the government builds
a new road, all residents in the vicinity will have quicker
access to neighboring towns and potential economic ben-
efits stemming from that access.
A "special benefit," on the other hand, is a benefit
unique to the remainder and does not apply to other prop-
erties. If the new road takes a small portion of a farmer's
property, its very presence will provide the farmer a general
benefit of quicker transportation on her remaining land.
But the road builders might also drain a large marsh on the
farmer's land in order to build the road. By draining this
marsh, the government makes a new section of the farmer's
land arable, thereby increasing the value of her remaining
land. This benefit, which increases the value of the land, is
a special benefit that is unique to the farmer alone.
Understanding the general/special distinction is impor-
tant because many courts, at least nominally, will only
offset special benefits when calculating just compensation
and will not offset general benefits.7 Unfortunately, courts
have applied this distinction in ways that present at least
two practical problems. First, the definitions of, and dis-
tinction between, general and special benefits are treated
differently and frequently muddled to the point that "the
difference between the two is difficult to ascertain even
for trained legal minds" and "many jurisdictions disagree
as to what constitutes a special benefit.'"38 Second, the
"shadowy"39 definitions and subjectivity of the distinction
create a great deal of flexibility that can undermine truly
just compensation and public confidence in the fairness of
eminent domain more broadly.
In the coastal context, the subjectivity of the special/
general distinction is obvious. If a dune restoration proj-
ect protects the coastline from future storm surges, should
that protection be deemed general, because although it
protects the first row of shoreline homes more than oth-
ers, it also provides substantial protections to homes far-
ther inland? Or should the coastline protection be deemed
34. See, e.g, E.H. Schopflocher, Annotation, Deduction of Benefits in Determin-
ing Compensation or Damages in Eminent Domain, 145 A.L.R. 7 (1945);
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 562 (1897).
35. See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 536 (N.J.
2013).
36. 3-8A NICHOLS, supra note 27, §8A.02.
37. See, e.g., Schopflocher, supra note 34.
38. 3-8A NICHOLS, supra note 27, §8A.02 (citing State v. Gatson, 617 S.W.2d
80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (internal citations omitted); State Highway
Comm'n v. Koziatek, 639 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
39. Koziatek, 639 S.W2d at 88 ("In practical application, the distinction be-
tween special and general benefits is shadowy at best.").
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special, because the first row of homeowners is protected
from complete destruction, while others are only protected
from storm damage? If the dune system stretches past 75
houses, is the benefit general because 75 property owners
are benefited, or special because only 75 of 75,000 resi-
dents are benefited?
But importantly, unlike the requirement of "just
compensation," the special/general dichotomy is not
a constitutional distinction4 and, perhaps because of
this, the Supreme Court has never really applied the
distinction. Though the Court has written about the
distinction and sometimes treated it as a controlling
rule, the Court has only used it as a post hoc descrip-
tion of benefits after having determined, on "other
grounds," whether those benefits should offset com-
pensation. When the Court offsets benefits, it describes
the benefits as special; when the Court refuses to off-
set, it describes the benefits as general. The "other
grounds," the true analytical distinction on which the
Court relies, is not breadth of benefits, but whether or
not the benefits are certain and calculable.
A variety of cases have dealt with the benefit-offset
problem in situations including the construction of
canals,41 roads,42 schools,43 parks,44 reservoirs,4  public
transit,46 and river tolls, 47 but two cases with opposing
outcomes demonstrate the Supreme Court's underlying
analytical consistency.
In Olson v. United States, the Court dealt with poten-
tial economic benefits to remainder property that were too
speculative and incalculable to offset against compensa-
tion.48 Olson involved condemnation of lands flooded for a
reservoir.49 The government argued that the change brought
about by the new reservoir would allow the neighboring
property owners, whose lands were subject to partial tak-
ings, to use their new frontage for power generation.50 The
remaining property was certainly "physically adaptable"
for power generation, but making generation a reality was
contingent on the landowners agreeing to work together.1
The Court refused to offset compensation by the economic
benefits of potential power generation, reasoning that the
benefits were too speculative and too difficult to calculate,
as they would not accrue until an indefinite and uncertain
point in the future.12
The Court in Bauman v. Ross, relying on similar rea-
soning but with different facts, reached a different con-
40. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 584 (1897).
41. See Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key, 5 E Cas. 563 (D.C. Cir. 1829).
42. See Bauman, 167 U.S. 548. See also Garrison v. City of New York, 88 U.S.
196, 198 (1874).
43. Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 133 U.S. 553 (1890).
44. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 284 (1893).
45. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
46. McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354 (1918).
47. Monangahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
48. 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934).
49. Id. at 248.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 256-57.
52. Id.
clusion.13 In Bauman, the U.S. Congress began a project
to improve the street layout in the District of Columbia,
partially condemning lots to lay road. 14 The authorizing
act directed the jury, in setting compensation, to consider
the benefit to the remainder of the property from the new
street system." The Court upheld this provision. 6 The
Justices held that courts may reduce compensation based
on a real, certain, and calculable benefit to a remainder,
noting that the Constitution "contains no express prohi-
bition against considering benefits in estimating the just
compensation" nor against considering "special and direct
benefits.."17 But the Court's use of the term "special,"
' 58
which it contrasted with "general," or those benefits "in
common with all lands in the neighborhood"59 or "benefits
which result to the public as a whole," introduced the con-
fusion that persists to this day.
60
Bauman implied that courts could only consider nar-
rowly accruing benefits and must ignore those that were
broadly applicable, but this was not, in fact, the analysis
that the Court used. Instead, Bauman reasoned that other
courts had offset benefits that were "direct," "actual,"
"in fact," "proximate,'' "immediately accruing," "capa-
ble of present estimation," or "capable of "reasonable
computation.5' 61 The Court rejected, and saw other courts
reject, benefits that were in the "indefinite future," "contin-
gent and speculative," or might only "arise in the future."
62
The certainty and calculability around the economic ben-
efit of the new road system persuaded the Court to offset
benefits against compensation.63
Later Supreme Court opinions continue to apply Bau-
man's and Olson's "certainty versus speculation" test, but
often conflate that test with the special/general distinction.
McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co. is the prime example.
The McCoy Court considered compensation due a hotel
owner whose property was partially taken to construct an
elevated railway. The Court held that a state may permit
consideration of "actual benefits-enhancements in mar-
ket value-flowing directly from a public work, although
all in the neighborhood receive like advantages.5' 64 In other
words, the benefits could be widespread and still offset
compensation as long as they were actual enhancements
to market value.
This confusion persists to this day.65 Courts analyze
whether a benefit to the remainder's market value is cer-
53. 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
54. Id at 550-51.
55. Id at 557 (first alteration in original, second alteration not in original).
56. Id at 584.
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id. at 577 (citing Mecham v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 291, 298, 299
(Mass. 1849)).
60. Id. at 581 (citing Commissioners v. O'Sullivan, 17 Kan. 58, 60 (Kan.
1876)).
61. Id. at 576-82.
62. Id. at 577, 584.
63. Id. at 581 (citing O'Sullivan, 17 Kan. at 60)).
64. 247 U.S. 354, 366 (1918).
65. See United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S 411, 415-16
(1926) (holding that a court could consider "direct" and "immediate" ben-
efits, but explaining that by virtue of being direct and immediate the ben-
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tain and nonspeculative and ignore the breadth of the
benefit, but insist on couching their analysis in special/
general terminology.66 The Supreme Court should fol-
low the actual analysis in this line of cases, articulating
their reasoning while explicitly rejecting the unhelpful
special/general distinction. Unfortunately, when recently
given the chance in Home,67 the Court did not embrace
its opportunity.
Ill. The Supreme Court Fails to Clarify Its
Jurisprudence
After the Great Depression, Congress enacted the Agri-
cultural Marketing Agreement Act of 193768 to estab-
lish more orderly commodity markets for, among other
things, raisins.6 9 Under the Act and its regulations, raisin
growers' harvests are split into two portions: The "free-
tonnage" portion is sold,70 while a "reserve" portion, per
a federal "marketing order,"71 is sent to a government Rai-
sin Committee to control the supply and, therefore, the
market price of raisins.72 Marvin and Laura Horne, Cali-
fornia raisin farmers, challenged this system and argued
that the marketing order was an invalid government sei-
zure of private property, specifically their raisins, without
just compensation.
73
That challenge rose to the Supreme Court, which deliv-
ered an opinion in Home on June 22, 2015.7' Home raised
a number of interesting questions, but one is particularly
relevant to the matter of takings compensation for coastal
climate change projects. The Court held, 8-1, that the gov-
ernment seizure of the Homes' property was a physical tak-
ing that required just compensation.71 However, it also is
likely that the Homes received a monetary benefit from the
long-term operation of the supply management program
76
that created an "orderly raisin market."77 Given this benefit,
efits were "special" even though common to all others). See also Blanchette
v. Connecticut General Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 151 (1974).
66. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934) (finding that land-
owners whose lands were partially condemned to create a reservoir need
not have compensation offset by new cooperative uses of power generation
"within the realm of possibility" that were not "reasonably probable"). See
also United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 35, 15 ELR 20117
(1984) (setting aside a measure of value based on speculation in favor of
market value because a speculative "approach would add uncertainty and
complexity to the valuation proceeding without any necessary improvement
in the process").
67. Home v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 14-275, 2015 WL 2473384, 45 ELR
20120 (U.S. June 22, 2015).
68. 7 U.S.C. §602 (2012).
69. Raisins Produced From Grapes Grown in California, 7 C.ER. §989 (2014).
70. Home, 2015 WL 2473384, at *3.
71. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. §§601-674 (2012).
72. Home, 2015 WL 2473384, at *3. See also Raisins Produced From Grapes
Grown in California, 7 C.ER. §§989.1 et seq. (2014).
73. Home, 2015 WL 2473384, at *4.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Raisins Produced From Grapes Grown in California; Final Free and
Reserve Percentages for 2002-03 Crop Natural (Sun-Dried) Seedless and
Zante Currant Raisins, 68 Fed. Reg. 41686, 41686 (July 15, 2003) ("The
volume regulation percentages are intended to help stabilize raisin supplies
and prices, and strengthen market conditions.").
77. Home, 2015 WL 2473384, at *4.
should the Court adjust compensation by offsetting the ben-
efits from the compensation award? On this question, a five-
Justice majority concluded that it should not offset.
78
Three Justices in the minority argued that the case
should be remanded for the lower courts to calculate
compensation, adjusting for any benefit that the Hornes
received from the increased market price flowing from
the raisin supply management program.79 The govern-
ment argued, and Justice Stephen Breyer, on behalf of
himself as well as Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Elena Kagan, agreed, that the Takings Clause entitled
a property owner "to be put in as good a position pecu-
niarily as if his property had not been taken, which is
to say that he must be made whole but is not entitled
to more."80 Justice Breyer concluded that the lower court
should adjust compensation by the benefit of the regula-
tory program.8 1 If the benefit exceeds, or exactly matches,
the value of the taken property, the government need not
provide additional compensation.82
Chief Justice John Roberts' majority opinion dismissed
Justice Breyer's reasoning as the "notion that general reg-
ulatory activity ... can constitute just compensation for
a specific physical taking.'" 8 3 Indeed, the Home majority
rejected consideration of what "the value of the reserve rai-
sins would have been without the price support program"
and consideration of other regulatory benefits,8" calling
this type of benefit hypothetical or speculative.8 Rather,
Chief Justice Roberts argued for the "clear and administra-
ble rule" that "just compensation ... be measured by the
market value of property at the time of the taking.'"8 6 His
conclusion flows from the Court's precedent and presents
a more appropriate, if not detailed and explicit, outline for
addressing the benefit-offset problem.
Home presented the opportunity to resolve the lingering
issue of how to deal with the benefit-offset problem. How-
ever, the question was barely briefed87 and not forcefully
presented at oral argument,88 and though Justice Breyer
chose to make it the centerpiece of his three-Justice par-
tial dissent, Chief Justice Roberts gave it only superficial
78. Home, 2015 WL 2473384, at " 12 ("In any event, this litigation presents no
occasion to consider the broader issues [of calculating just compensation].").
79. Id. at *8. In fact, in this case, the Raisin Committee never took possession of
the raisins at issue. Id. at *4. Rather, they fined the Hornes the value of the
raisins and the Homes refused to pay, claiming that the fine would amount
to a taking. Id. Therefore, whatever the ultimate compensation, the govern-
ment would only pay this amount if it chose to follow through and acquire
the raisins at issue. Had the benefit-offset applied in this case and the courts
determined that the benefit would entirely or very dramatically reduce the
necessary compensation, then perhaps the ruling would have had no practi-
cal effect on the raisin marketing order.
80. Id. at "13 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (alteration and quotation
marks omitted).
81. Id. at *15.
82. Id.
83. Id. at * 12.
84. Id. at "11.
85. Id. at "12 ("[T]he Government cites no support for its hypothetical-
based approach.").
86. Id.
87. Id. at "13 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. at *11.
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treatment. The majority probably reached the correct con-
clusion, but failed to explain its reasoning or announce a
usable rule.
Luckily, the New Jersey Supreme Court has offered a
robust explanation of, and justification for, the same rule
that the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt.
IV. The New Jersey Supreme Court
Clarifies a Rule
The state of New Jersey, the borough of Harvey Cedars,
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) were
preparing for a Hurricane Sandy-type event long before the
2012 superstorm.89 With 127 miles of coast, New Jersey
was particularly at risk.90 The state's vulnerability provoked
climate change adaptation planning, beginning with a
major dune restoration project in 2008 designed to pro-
tect the coast from massive storm surges that could destroy
homes and businesses.91 To carry out the effort, the local
governments purchased-through voluntary sale or emi-
nent domain condemnation92-easements from shorefront
property owners, and then built dunes 20 feet high and 30
feet wide.93 In Harvey Cedars, 66 properties willingly sold
easements; 16 were taken through eminent domain.94 One
of these 16 belonged to Harvey and Phyllis Karan.95
The borough originally offered the Karans $300 for a
strip of their land on which the borough would build and
maintain the new dune.96 The Karans refused, demand-
ing compensation for the land taken and for damage to
their remaining property's view.97 Harvey Cedars began
an eminent domain proceeding and acquired the property
by condemnation.98 Following the borough's acquisition,
compensation for the Karans was set at $700.99 The Karans
rejected the valuation and demanded ajury trial.100
At trial, it was clear that the dune would protect the
Karans' home from a major storm.11 Evidence was pre-
sented that without the dune, the Corps estimated there
was a 56% chance that within the next 30 years a storm
would destroy the home.102 With the dunes, their house
would be safe for the next two centuries.10 3 The judge ruled
that the jury should not consider the storm protection ben-
89. See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 527 (N.J.
2013).
90. NORBERT P. PSUTY & DOUGLAS D. OFIARA, COASTAL HAZARD MANAGE-
MENT: LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FROM NEW JERSEY 9-10 (2002).
91. See, e.g., Karan, 70 A.3d at 528.
92. Id. at 527-28.
93. Id. at 527.
94. Id. at 527-28.
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Borough of Harvey Cedars at 10, Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70
A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013).
100. Karan, 70 A.3d at 528.
101. Id. at 529.
102. Id.
103. Id.
efits.104 Without authority to offset, the jury returned a ver-
dict requiring the government to compensate the Karans
in the amount of $375,000.105 The case of Harvey Cedars
v. Karan reached the New Jersey Supreme Court, which,
after considering New Jersey's occasional practice of ignor-
ing general benefits, opted to change the law.10
6
The specific question that the NewJersey Supreme Court
resolved was how to calculate just compensation, consider-
ing both the Karans' reduced ocean view and improved
storm protection.10 7 Interestingly, the parties argued this
case on May 13, 2013,108 five years after the Corps con-
structed the new dunes, but only six months after those
same dunes had prevented Hurricane Sandy from even
slightly damaging the Karans' house.10 9
The New Jersey court began its discussion by noting that
partial takings analysis "has not necessarily reflected the
straightforward fair market value approach that is evident
in total-takings cases."110 In its unanimous opinion, the
Karan court declared that it "need not pay slavish homage
to labels that have outlived their usefulness," and explained
that "the terms special and general benefits do more to
obscure than illuminate the basic principles governing
the computation of just compensation in eminent domain
cases."' The court held that the fair market value, deter-
mined by "what a willing buyer and willing seller would
weigh in coming to an agreement on the property's value
at the time of the taking," should govern.112 "[J]ust com-
pensation should be based on non-conjectural and quantifi-
able benefits that are capable of reasonable calculation at
the time of the taking."
'1 13
It was not a stretch, then, for the New Jersey court to
reason that "[a] willing purchaser of beachfront prop-
erty would obviously value the view and proximity to the
ocean. But it is also likely that a rational purchaser would
place a value on a protective barrier that shielded his prop-
erty from partial or total destruction.'114 This is the crux of
the fair market value approach that Karan adopted.
V. A Cohesive Rule
In light of Karan, its own precedent, and the unsteady
jurisprudence it left after Horne, the Supreme Court should
codify the reasoning in its line of cases and announce
that the special benefit/general benefit distinction is not
104. Id.
105. Id. at 531.
106. See generally, id. at 524.
107. Id at 526.
108. Id at 524.
109. Nicholas Huba & Kirk Moore, Harvey Cedars Homeowners Demand
Payment From Town for Spoiling Ocean View, ASBURY PARK PRESS,
Dec. 20, 2012, available at http://archive.app.com/article/20121125/
NJNEWS2002/311250050 ("Thanks to a line of recently erected two-story
high sand dunes, Harvey and Phyllis Karan's $1.7 million oceanfront house,
and the town, stood fast when Sandy stormed ashore.").
110. Karan, 70 A.3d at 535.
111. Id. at 540.
112. Id
113. Id (emphasis added).
114. Id at 541.
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valid. It should declare that market value will constitute
just compensation, and that market value will be assessed
based on only nonspeculative factors calculable at the time
of the taking.
The Supreme Court has applied consistent reasoning
when dealing with the benefit-offset problem, but has not
articulated a rule in a sufficiently clear and powerful way.
Despite the fact that such a rule would not depart from
its current jurisprudence, the Court failed to take this
step in Home. The Court's ongoing failure to clearly out-
line a fair-market-based benefit-offset rule may have led
to the Chief Justice's correct conclusions, but insufficient
analysis, in Home. When properly articulated, however,
the rule aligns with Chief Justice Roberts' conclusion
and parallels the New Jersey court's reasoning in Karan,
despite the fact that those cases reach opposite conclusions
with respect to offsetting.
The Karan court provided good logic for disposing of
the special/general distinction and relying instead on fair
market value.11 Karan reasoned: "the terms special and
general benefits do more to obscure than illuminate the
basic principles governing the computation of just compen-
sation in eminent domain cases."'116 The court concluded
that "general benefit" is too amorphous a term.117 In some
courts, general benefits are "speculative or conjectural,"
which ought not to offset compensationll'; in other courts,
general benefits are broadly applicable or widespread ben-
efits, which may offset compensation.119 Rather than rely
on the old distinction, the New Jersey court put forward a
better rule:
[Jiust compensation should be based on non-conjectural
and quantifiable benefits that are capable of reasonable cal-
culation at the time of the taking. Speculative benefits pro-
jected into the indefinite future should not be considered.
Benefits that both a willing buyer and willing seller would
agree enhance the value of the property should be con-
sidered in determining just compensation, whether those
benefits are categorized as special or general.12
It is helpful to define some of the terms that underlie
the rule enunciated by the New Jersey court. Conjec-
tural benefits are those that might arise "in the indefinite
future," '121 while unquantifiable benefits are those that are
"so uncertain in character as to be incapable of present
estimation."'122 In contrast, the court will look for benefits
that are "capable of present estimation"123 (i.e., reasonably
certain) and "capable of... reasonable computation"124 (i.e.,
115. Id. at 538.




120. Id. (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
121. Id. at 537.
122. Id. (quoting Mangles v. Hudson Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 25 A.
322, 323 (N.J. 1892)).
123. Id. at 538 (quoting Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 585 (1897)).
124. Id. (quoting Bauman, 167 U.S. at 585).
calculable), and are an "actual benefit"125 (i.e., nonspecula-
tive) and an "enhancement in market value"126 (i.e., real
and measurable). The Supreme Court's decisions discussed
above already represent a nearly identical framework while
nonetheless claiming to rely on the special/general distinc-
tion, with resulting confusion that the New Jersey court's
reasoning cuts through.
With regard to a regulatory program or public work
that creates benefits, a court applying Karan's compen-
sation computation rule needs only to determine if the
benefits are reasonably certain and capable of present cal-
culation. If the benefits are reasonably certain and capable
of present calculation and if they do not require specu-
lation, qualitative judgments, or delay while waiting for
a prospective benefit to actually manifest so that it can
be calculated, then the court can determine how these
benefits will impact the fair market value of the remain-
ing property. If benefits raise the remainder's fair market
value, the court may offset compensation by the marginal
increase in that value.
In Horne, in effect though certainly not explicitly, Chief
Justice Roberts declined to make any special adjustments
or to speculate about what fair market value might be in
the absence of the raisin-marketing program. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts followed the Court's precedent by recogniz-
ing that compensation should be set at the current market
value of the Homes' raisins, which included the benefits
of the regulatory program, and which the government
had already calculated as part of its enforcement effort. In
extensive administrative hearings, a U.S. Department of
Agriculture judicial officer calculated the market value of
the Homes' raisins that the Hornes failed to reserve.127 Cal-
culating this price simply involved multiplying the tonnage
of raisins that the Hornes should have turned over to the
Raisin Administrative Committee by the average price per
ton of raisins in the relevant crop year.121 This number was
an established market value that did not rely on specula-
tion, but on actual prices, and was readily calculable.
To offset the regulatory benefits would have required the
Court to speculate about the impacts of the generations-
old program, evaluate retrospectively how that program
impacted prices over more than one-half century, and
determine how that long-term impact influenced contem-
porary prices. This method would have resulted in lower
compensation (or possibly no compensation), but it would
have placed more burden on the Court and injected greater
uncertainty and speculation into the process.
Courts should rely on fair market value, where ascer-
tainable, and refrain from adjusting that value based on
speculative or uncertain factors. Courts should discard the
misleading dichotomy of special and general benefits, and
instead consider whether benefits are reasonably certain and
capable of present estimation. Courts should not endeavor
125. Id. (citing McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 366 (1918).
126. Id. (citing McCoy, 247 U.S. at 366).
127. Home v. U.S. Dep't ofAgric., 750 E3d 1128, 1135 n.6 (9th Cir. 2014).
128. Home v. U.S. Dept of Agric., No. 08-1549, 2009 WL 4895362, at " 19
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009).
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to perform subjective and speculative adjustments to fair
market value based on potential but uncertain benefits that
are not presently calculable.
VI. Conclusion
Climate change makes coastal adaptation strategies a
necessity in shoring up some of the nation's coastal vulner-
abilities. However, as has been seen nationwide generally,
and in New Jersey specifically, the lack of private coopera-
tion can necessitate the use of eminent domain. Unfortu-
nately, decisionmakers in coastal towns are still awaiting a
clear message from the Supreme Court on eminent domain
compensation for a partial taking.
With the increasing frequency and intensity of storms
and the growing reliance on soft coastal adaptation mea-
sures, the Supreme Court will likely have the opportunity
to clearly and directly resolve three issues. First, the Court
must discharge the special/general distinction. That dis-
tinction has only added confusion over its lifespan and has
not served as an administrable benchmark for deciding
when to offset a benefit against compensation. Second, the
Court should reiterate that fair market value is the basis
for determining just compensation. Third, and finally, the
Court should elaborate on its prior holdings that benefits
resulting from a public project or regulation, whether wide-
spread or narrow, may be considered as part of a fair mar-
ket assessment only if they are certain, nonspeculative, and
presently calculable. In other words, such benefits should
be part of the government's valuation only if they are the
sort of benefits that a willing buyer and willing seller would
consider in reaching a price on the open market.
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